Death Squads: The Hidden Killers of Colombia by Rance, Cullen
Western Oregon University 
Digital Commons@WOU 
Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) Department of History 
6-10-2020 
Death Squads: The Hidden Killers of Colombia 
Cullen Rance 
Western Oregon University, crance17@wou.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his 
 Part of the Latin American History Commons, and the Political History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rance, Cullen, "Death Squads: The Hidden Killers of Colombia" (2020). Student Theses, Papers and 
Projects (History). 274. 
https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his/274 
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at Digital Commons@WOU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons@WOU. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@wou.edu, kundas@mail.wou.edu, 
bakersc@mail.wou.edu. 
Cullen Rance 
HST 499 
04-16-2020 
Senior Thesis                       
 
Death Squads: The Hidden Killers of Colombia 
  
1 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction Pg. 1. 
Origins of the Death Squats in Colombia Pg. 7. 
Criminal Behaviors of the Death Squads Pg. 9. 
Collusion between the Colombian Government and the Death Squads Pg. 14. 
Prosecutorial Immunity of the Death Squads Pg. 21. 
Motivations of Colombian Death Squads and the reasoning behind government 
impunity Pg. 23. 
Conclusion Pg. 27. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
On May 5th, 2003, in Betoyes, Colombia, a 16-year-old girl named Omaira 
Fernandez went to the river to wash her clothes. Unfortunately for the expectant mother, 
that same morning, a group of soldiers dressed in paramilitary uniforms with “AUC 
armbands” began to raid the town. Fernandez was gang-raped and killed, her body was  
cut open and both her and her baby were thrown into the river. The rape and 
assassination of Fernandez and her unborn child then went unpunished by Colombian 
officials.1 According to Amnesty International, these “paramilitaries” were in reality 
soldiers detached from the eighteenth brigade of the Colombian Army in a false-flag 
operation.2 Officially, the Colombian army, the paramilitaries, and the guerrillas are all 
separate groups, “sworn” enemies to one another. Yet, paramilitary groups have 
been able to direct lucrative extortion rackets, international drug trafficking rings, and 
murders of anyone who dares to threaten them, without an effective reaction from the 
state. Therefore, the origin of the paramilitaries as a civilian extension of the Colombian 
armed forces is a legacy that even today cannot be outlived. Moreover, the 
paramilitaries have had a close working relationship with officials in Colombia’s military 
and government since their origin. Thus, the close association between the Colombian 
government and the death squads has resulted in the lack of prosecution of these 
paramilitary forces for their crimes.  
 
1 “Fear for Safety/Possible ‘Disappearance.’” Amnesty international. Last modified June 3, 2003, 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/104000/amr230432003en.pdf. 
2 “Sexual Violence against Indigenous Women as a Weapon of War: El Tema: Versión Solo Texto: Otramérica,” 
Otramérica, last modified June 4, 2012, http://otramerica.com/solo-texto/temas/sexual-violence-against-indigenous-
women-as-a-weapon-of-war/2012. 
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Different accounts by historians have examined the origin of the death squads 
and their connections to Colombian officials. As early as the 1980s, Bruce Bagley3 
mentioned how these groups developed close ties with the military for the purpose of 
exterminating communist dissidents.4 To further this connection, the testimonies and 
findings from James Brittain and William Aviles tie the support given by the United 
States into the paramilitary squad’s development. Additionally, historian German 
Arcinegias takes this further adding that violent paramilitary groups Muerte a 
Secuestradores and Alianza Americana Anticomunista developed under the lack of 
oversight of death squads and used this pretext to forge close associations with the 
military.5 This paper will  also analyze primary sources such as Law 48 of 1968.  This 
legislation defined paramilitary squads as essential to the defense of the nation while 
showing obvious American influence as Special American military advisors 
recommended its creation. Furthermore, it is the language of “guaranteeing national 
independence and institutional stability” by using civil defense squads that reflect an 
American agenda rather than a Colombian one. 
As current literature indicates, the paramilitary groups carried out numerous 
human rights abuses. Among other actions, they committed crimes such as 
dismemberment, mass murder and rape, against both suspected guerilla supporters, 
who often were impoverished civilians, and the guerrilla fighters themselves.6 As a 
 
3 Bagley is a former international studies professor at the University Miami. He has also completed 
consultancy work for numerous agencies including the Department of Justice and the FBI. “Dr. Bruce 
Bagley,” Swansea University, accessed June 4, 2020, 
https://www.swansea.ac.uk/gdpo/technicaladvisors/drbrucebagley/. 
4 Bruce Micheal Bagley, "The New Hundred Years War? US National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin 
America," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 1 (1988): 161-82, accessed March 18, 2020, 
doi:10.2307/165793. 
5 Germán Arcinegias, Colombia’s Killer Networks (Colombia: Human Rights Watch, 1996),1 and 19. 
6  Ibid, 9. 
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result of loose regulation, these heavily armed groups became tools for those who paid 
them well, and drug cartels were not an exception. This relationship between the 
paramilitaries and the drug cartels is further supported by a 2003 interview completed 
by CNN with a former Colombian national police officer. This interview corroborates that 
the Colombian Army relied on the Medellin Cartel to arm and fund paramilitary groups 
that hunted guerrillas. This would mean that paramilitary groups enjoyed the profits of 
the drug trade in addition to the Colombian military well into the 1980s. As a result, this 
hampered Colombian police efforts to bring the cartel to justice and resulted in a deeply 
corrupted network of protection for the cartel and the paramilitaries. By the early 1990s, 
drug cartels feared extradition and used armed groups to intimidate and kill anyone who 
stood in their way. A shift then occurred among historians which focused on the mass 
genocide of peasants, and farming communities which were alleged to have supported 
the guerrilla groups that the police and military were hunting. For example,  Dennis 
Hanratty’s 1992 work discusses the Best Corner massacre committed by a far-right 
group known as the Magnificent.7 This group alleged that the inhabitants were guerrilla 
supporters. However, they presented no evidence to support this conclusion. This 
relates to my thesis as the Best Corner Massacre was the purposeful targeting of 
political subversives who the Colombian military was ordered to hunt. Yet, paramilitary 
squads killed these targets, which would suggest a close working relationship between 
those two factions. Moreover, a 1990 cable tie to Robert Mcnamara’s8 office showed 
that U.S officials knew about human rights abuses committed by the Colombian military 
 
7 Dennis Hanratty, “The Drug War,”  U.S Government Accountability Office, last modified February 1992, accessed 
March 12, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/104300.pdf. 
8 Former Secretary of Defense of the United States. 
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against civilians. This would indicate that the close working relationship between 
paramilitaries and the military extended to sharing methods of torture and brutality.  
By the early 2000’s, historians took an expanded look at the failures of human 
rights groups to address the problems that paramilitary squads have caused. For  
example, Victoria Sanford’s 2003 book “Learning to Kill by Proxy” focuses on the 
failures of intervention by human rights groups against massacres in Colombia.9 
Sanford’s work is an important piece that shows a cold war connection between 
paramilitary death squads and the military that still persists today. To build on this 
connection, this paper will also show that the Colombian police investigated these 
human rights abuses , but they were gradually buried by the late 1990s. The quotes and 
experiences from Colombian police officers in Maria Moreno’s work No More Dead Here 
affirm this connection.  
A last group of historians have analyzed other social factors relating to the armed 
conflict between guerrillas and death squads, in terms of economic disparities, and 
racism. Camilo Gonzales’s 2014 article “The Conflict in Colombia” discusses how Afro 
Colombians make up a disproportionate amount of the members of FARC and typically 
occupy lower positions.10 This would suggest that Afro Colombians see joining groups 
fighting paramilitaries as the only way out of poverty. In addition, Tatiana Gonzalez 
further highlighted disparities between Afro and non-Afro Colombians in terms of 
healthcare and education in her report titled A report on the situation of the rights of 
 
9 Victoria Sanford, "Learning to Kill by Proxy: Colombian Paramilitaries and the Legacy of Central American 
Death Squads, Contras, and Civil Patrols," Social Justice 30, no. 3 (2003): 63-81.  www.jstor.org/stable/29768209. 
10 Camilo Gonzales, “The Conflict in Colombia,” United States Institute of Peace, last modified June 14, 2014, 
https://www.usip.org/. 
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Afro-Colombians.11  According to Gonzalez, Afro Colombians are slaughtered at an 
alarming rate by paramilitary squads. This factor  relates to my thesis and adds a racial 
motivator to the crimes of the paramilitary death squads. Another social and economic 
factor to take into consideration is poverty, as many of the victims of these death 
squads are poor and working class. By contrast, the wealthier landowners  hire 
paramilitary squads for “protection.” Therefore, when looking at the crimes for which 
paramilitary death squads have received impunity, it becomes impossible not to 
consider an element of class warfare. Lastly, there has also been a renewed interest in 
the discussion of how Afro Colombians were specifically targeted by a military operation 
named Genesis12. This operation has further ties to paramilitary death squads as their 
commander utilized right wing paramilitary groups to carry out the killings and forced 
displacement of the villagers. However, to date there has been little prosecution against 
the perpetrators of this operation, and some feel that the truth of the incident has been 
buried. 
1. Origins of the Death Squads in Colombia 
 The story of the present day conflict traces its origins back to the late 1940’s  
when then socialist Colombian presidential candidate Jorge Gaitan was assassinated 
by a supporter.13 This event set off a bloody and painfully long civil war which also partly 
owed itself to the indifference of the Colombian government toward worker’s rights and 
 
11 Tatiana Gonzalez, Racial Discrimination and Human Rights in Colombia. A report on the situation of the rights 
of Afro-Colombians (United Kingdom: Observatory on Racial Discrimination, 2014). 
12 Forced displacement of countless Afro Colombians in 1998 by armed group AUC. 
13 Herbert Braun, The Assassination of Gaitan: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia (Wisconsin: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 7. 
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labor repression.14  By the 1950s, the military pushed the socialist elements into the 
jungles and countryside of Colombia. The reason behind this plan is that these groups 
wanted to create socialist communes, or self-defense communities, that provided for the 
needs of its members while also protecting them from the violence of landowners.15  
Yet, in the context of the early cold war, American assistance funded not only the 
Colombian military but the establishment of hunter-killer paramilitary teams that sought 
to stomp out these forested socialist communes.16  
American assistance in Colombia began as early as 1959 when the Eisenhower 
administration put together a team of CIA advisers to oversee the country after La 
Violencia.17 Colombia was a key cold war supporter for the United States but had been 
overcome by La Violencia. Unsurprisingly, this political unrest prevented Colombia  from 
contributing to American victory in its war against socialism. As a result, the United 
States realized Colombia needed to transform itself militarily and politically to defeat a 
resurgence of guerrilla violence. Thus, Colombia brought in American advisers to train 
officials in political, psychological warfare and special operations. The culmination of 
these efforts became known as Plan LAZO18 which targeted specific “guerrilla enclaves” 
 
14 “The Labor Movement.” Colombia - The Labor Movement. U.S Library of Congress. Accessed April 17, 2020. 
http://countrystudies.us/colombia/64.htm. 
15 James Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia (New York: Pluto Press, 2010), 2-3. 
16 William,Avilés, "Paramilitarism and Colombia's Low-Intensity Democracy," Journal of Latin American Studies 
38, no. 2 (2006), 379, accessed April 30, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/3875504.  
17 La violencia was a period of civil unrest in Colombia that was forcefully put down by the Colombian Government. 
Dennis M. Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counter‐Insurgency Efforts in Colombia 
1959–1965,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 6, no. 3 (1995): 304–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319508423115. 
18  A 1959 anti-terrorist assistance program supported by the United States to bolster Colombia’s effectiveness as a 
cold war ally. (Dennis M. Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counter‐Insurgency Efforts 
in Colombia 1959–1965,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 6, no. 3 (1995): 304–27, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319508423115.) 
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using newly trained Colombian soldiers to take over these areas on behalf of the 
government.19   
Civilian groups were also trained by the Colombian military and fought alongside 
them. Yet, civilian groups lacked real oversight or control, and frequently engaged in 
crimes such as rape, and mass murder of peasant communities. This was further made 
possible by President Guillermo Valencia’s Decree 339820, which passed in 1965. This 
regulation stated “all Colombians,  men and women, will be used by the government for 
activities that contribute to the reestablishment of order.”21  
Two of the most prominent Colombian officials to support American assistance 
were General Alberto Novoa, a veteran of the Korean War, and president Valencia 
himself.22 Valencia was likely persuaded by the military officers under his command who 
saw the need for counter insurgency in maintaining public order, including covert 
intelligence gathering.23 In contrast, Novoa was a Korean War veteran who fought with 
the Americans against Chinese troops. He believed that keeping the socialists from 
power would “mend the national social fabric and infrastructure.”24 Further clues as to 
what he meant come from his speech in 1963 in Panama where he mentioned that to 
defeat the guerrilla, they must “drain the sea in which they swim.”25 In other words, he 
 
19 Dennis M. Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counter‐Insurgency Efforts in Colombia 
1959–1965,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 6, no. 3 (1995): 304–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319508423115. 
20 A decree legalizing the mobilization of civilian soldiers for security reasons. “Colombia's Killer Networks: The 
Military - Paramilitary Partnership and the United States.” Accessed April 17, 2020. 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer2.htm. 
21 Steven S. Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia, (New York: Routledge,2003), 34. 
22 “Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military - Paramilitary Partnership and the United States,” Human Rights Watch, 
accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer2.htm. 
23 Dennis M. Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counter‐Insurgency Efforts in Colombia 
1959–1965,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 6, no. 3 (1995): 304–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319508423115. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Forrest Hylton, Evil Hour in Colombia, (London: Verso, 2006), 56.  
9 
supported eliminating the source of support of the guerrillas, which could be 
accomplished by providing better public medical care and education. Novoa believed 
that his stance on anti-communism would greatly benefit his country.  
By contrast the plan of counter-insurgency against the rebels only accomplished 
the strengthening of armed paramilitaries and further pretexts for increased violence 
against the Colombian people.26 In addition, the “civil defense groups” and military sent  
those accused of being guerrilla sympathizers to military courts, with a suspension of 
their constitutional rights.27 Paramilitary soldiers became thus legitimized to charge 
civilians criminally, despite not being official soldiers. As a result, Plan Lazo contributed 
to the prosecutorial immunity for the crimes of paramilitaries since the 1960s.  In 
parallel, the efforts of the Colombian government proved ineffective in stopping the 
guerrilla conflict.  
By 1964, the armed groups of guerrillas that persisted in the jungles of Colombia 
expanded after an overwhelming raid by the Colombian military on their stronghold. 
16,000 Colombian troops and an unknown number of paramilitary irregulars attacked 
the peasant commune of Marquetalia which only had 48 armed members.28 
Subsequently, the guerillas escaped and created  a more organized and well-armed 
group known as FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. This movement 
became the driving force behind the continual “need” for a paramilitary presence within 
 
26 “II The history of the military-paramilitary partnership,” Human Rights Watch, Seven Stories Press, last modified 
1996, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer2.htm.  
27 “II The history of the military-paramilitary partnership,” Human Rights Watch, Seven Stories Press, last modified 
1996, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer2.htm.  
28 Steven S. Dudley Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. (New York: Routledge,2003),10. 
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Colombia.29 In 1968, this problem evolved when Law 48 allowed the creation of “civil 
patrols” and both the outfitting and training of these irregular troops with military grade 
weapons, under the guise of acting in the interests of national security.30 Yet, the lack of 
proper regulation of these groups allowed them to be used for other purposes such as 
being employed as self-defense militias by private “wealthy” individuals as bodyguards 
and private security.31 During the 1970s, these paramilitary groups were put to the test 
as guerrilla groups, mainly FARC, instituted a series of violent kidnappings against 
prominent landowners holding them for ransom.32  At this point, many FARC members 
still believed in the approach of dominating politically rather than through the use of 
force.  This included the use of public works projects, settling disputes and even acting 
as local law enforcement.33 The plan seemed to work as the Colombian communist 
party, FARC’s political ally, began to gain greater representation within the government. 
However, conservative elements of the Colombian government would see them as a 
threat, as part of the Cold War.34  
In 1978, the Secretary of Defense  General Luis Carlos Camacho Leyva 
perceived peaceful socialist protests as the “unarmed branch of subversion.” 35 This 
 
29 Kiraz Janicke, “War vs Peace: Colombia, Venezuela and the FARC Hostage Saga,” Third World Traveler, accessed 
February 9, 2008, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/South_America/Colombia_FARC.html. 
30 “Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military - Paramilitary Partnership and the United States.” Human Rights Watch, 
accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer2.htm. 
31 Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, and Rafael Santos, “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia,” 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, last modified October 2008, https://economics.mit.edu/files/9339. 
32 “Colombia: Information on the Former Guerrilla Group M-19,” Refworld, last modified March 25, 2003, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/414eee264.html. 
33 “Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military - Paramilitary Partnership and the United States,” Human Rights Watch, 
accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer2.htm. 
34 “Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military - Paramilitary Partnership and the United States,” Human Rights Watch, 
accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer2.htm. 
35 “Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military - Paramilitary Partnership and the United States,” Human Rights Watch, 
accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer2.htm. 
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group included government critics, trade unionists, and community organizers.  The 
plan to eliminate these political opponents created the need for a force that was not 
implicitly affiliated with the Colombian military but still possessed their training and 
resources. Unofficial troops already in operation had a loose affiliation with the 
government that would permit paramilitaries to receive orders without being 
acknowledged as regular members, who were subject to the same rules of engagement 
as the formal Colombian military. As a result, paramilitaries provided a clear path to 
quell opposition without holding anyone accountable.  
During the 1980’s, drug lords, paramilitaries, and security forces targeted 
socialist political members. The strongest paramilitary group was the ACCU,36 which 
gained its fortune from robbing drug shipments and protecting certain drug traffickers 
from guerrilla raids. Members of the communist political party, however, were not the 
only targets, and they also killed political opposition to drug lords. One such group, the 
Patriotic Union,37 was dealt a major blow as its leader was assassinated by a fourteen 
year old working for the paramilitary group ACCU.38  There was little prosecution 
against the groups who committed these assassinations, and the killers became 
“expendable” after the attacks.  The lack of prosecution, on the other hand, provided 
 
36 A paramilitary organization founded in the 1960s by the Castano brothers, sons of a rancher that was killed by 
guerrilla forces. 
37 Short-lived political arm of the FARC whose members were slowly killed off by the end of the 1980s. Colombia 
Reports. “Patriotic Union: Colombia Reports,” Colombia Reports, last modified August 28, 2019. 
https://colombiareports.com/patriotic-union/. 
38 “Colombia: Political Dynamics,” Carnelian International, Accessed April 17, 2020. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20040616211546/http://www.carnelian-
international.com/colombia/Political_Dynamics.htm. 
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strong evidence that the Colombian government was using paramilitary soldiers to 
pursue a “deliberate policy of political murder.”39  
2. Criminal Behavior of the Death Squads 
The official lack of oversight of the death squads and its contribution to their 
empowerment is corroborated by the experiences of Colombian lawyer and activist 
Jesus Maria Valle. From 1987 until his death in 1998, Valle was an outspoken critic and 
advocate for the poor as he himself had been one, growing up in a small shack with ten 
other siblings.40 As he reached adulthood, he became alarmed at the innocent civilians 
who were often killed, tortured, or displaced by the fighting between communist 
guerrillas and the Colombian military.41 Valle’s persistence in exposing lies and 
cooperation between the Colombian Army and death squads caused Governor Alvaro 
Uribe to label him as “an enemy of the armed forces.”42 In one of the most notable 
instances, Valle was able to prove through witness testimony that a heavily armed 
group of paramilitary soldiers, who were a part of the AUC43, passed through the only 
road leading to La Granja. This road went across a military base, where one of the 
smaller massacres took place, in which 15 were killed . The paramilitary group also 
raped, murdered, and displaced innocent civilians. Subsequently, the soldiers left the 
town using that same road as indicated by track marks from heavy vehicles. In addition, 
 
39 “Colombia: Political Dynamics,” Carnelian International, accessed April 17, 2020, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20040616211546/http://www.carnelian-
international.com/colombia/Political_Dynamics.htm. 
40 Maria, Sánchez-Moreno, “The Prophet” in There Are No Dead Here.  (New York: Bold Type Books, 2018). 
41 Maria, Sánchez-Moreno, “The Prophet” in There Are No Dead Here.  (New York: Bold Type Books, 2018). 
42 Maria, Sánchez-Moreno, “The Prophet” in There Are No Dead Here.  (New York: Bold Type Books, 2018). 
43 Successor Organization to the ACCU, headed by the Castano brothers. A unification of the ACCU and other 
paramilitary groups. 
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the town was surrounded by a dense forest, preventing the death squads from using an 
alternative path.44  
Valle’s experiences, in turn, reflected numerous factors which made the death 
squads even more powerful and violent by the end of the 1980s and continuing into the 
1990s. In the beginning of this era, the Medellin Cartel led by Pablo Escobar engaged in 
philanthropic activity.45 Escobar funded the building of schools, hospitals, and housing 
for Colombia’s poor.46 In this context, armed groups of paramilitaries portrayed as 
friends of the people were able to kill rivals and commit their crimes with relative ease.  
Consequently, death squads working for the drug cartels  received free passes by those 
who witnessed their crimes. Yet, the public saw another face of the Cartel as the U.S 
assistance urged a more aggressive government stance against drug trafficking. 
Colombian drug traffickers became alarmed at the extradition treaty between America 
and Colombia, that resulted from Reagan’s “just say no” campaign, which demanded 
that drug lords be sent from overseas to stand trial.47 They feared extradition to the 
United States as they could not bribe or enjoy the shorter sentences they would 
otherwise receive in their country. 48 As a result, Escobar began using his men to 
intimidate locals which included everything from torture to organized executions. The 
Medellin cartel offered up to $8000 bounties for each kill that the death squads 
 
44 Maria, Sánchez-Moreno, “The Prophet” in There Are No Dead Here,  (New York: Bold Type Books, 2018). 
45 Jack Child, The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1991, (San Francisco, California: Hoover Institution Press, 
1992), 35. 
46 Jenna Bowley, "Robin Hood or Villain: The Social Constructions of Pablo Escobar," University of Maine, last 
modified May 2013, https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1108&context=honors. 
47 “Killing Pablo,” CNN, Cable News Network, last modified May 25, 2003, 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/25/cp.00.html. 
48 “Killing Pablo,” CNN, Cable News Network, last modified May 25, 2003, 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/25/cp.00.html. 
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managed. Among others, this practice involved, judges, politicians, and Colombian 
police officers.49  
The campaign to desperately avoid extradition by hyperviolence did not end until 
Escobar’s death in 1993. Escobar controlled 80% of the cocaine entering the United 
States at his height, and alternative drug cartels, paramilitary organizations, and other 
criminal groups quickly acted to take advantage of the fragmented empire. A year after 
Escobar’s death, paramilitary group ACCU occupied many of the Medellin Cartel’s 
former transnational drug shipping points within the northern parts of Colombia.50 Newly 
acquired funds from these operations helped the ACCU network to control other 
paramilitary organizations such as MAS51, or death to kidnappers, and purchase more 
weapons. In 2000, AUC and ACCU leader Carlos Castano, also a leader of los Pepes52, 
mentioned that 70 percent of AUC funds came from narcotrafficking.53 As a result, 
paramilitary groups took advantage of the open Colombia narcotics market and used it 
to their own ends. 
 While paramilitaries took control over drug trade, Colombia president Virgilio 
Barco Vargas54 directly targeted cartels and traffickers. Although curiously, President 
 
49 Kevin Jack Riley, The Implications of Colombian Drug Industry and Death Squad Political Violence for U.S. 
Counternarcotics Policy, (Santa Monica, CA:Rand Corporation, 1993), pg 28-29. 
50 Nazih Richani, "the Paramilitary Connection," NACLA Report on the Americas 2, no. 5 (2000): 38–41, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/10714839.2000.11722632?scroll=top&needAccess=true. 
51 Paramilitary organization started by drug traffickers and ranchers to protect themselves from guerrillas who held 
individuals for ransom. 
52 known as people persecuted by Pablo Escobar, a paramilitary group that allied with the Colombian government to 
kill Escobar.  
53 “United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia,” Global Security, last modified April 2, 2012, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/auc.htm. 
54 President from 1986-1990, Vargas hunted and put in prison prominent drug trafficker Pablo Escobar during his 
initial capture. 
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Barco left paramilitary squads alone. His Decree 81355 established a council that 
convened on a regular basis to discuss counter paramilitary efforts, but it infrequently 
met. The lack of readiness to address the problem was due to the fact that many of the 
government officials within this council held strong ties to paramilitary organizations 
including the AUC.56  Inaction thus allowed paramilitary organizations to flourish 
throughout the 1990s, while the government’s reluctance to prosecute paramilitary 
squads for their crimes allowed them to flourish financially. Vargas’s policy put cartels in 
prison, or brought them to justice, but paramilitary groups took their territory and 
continued drug trafficking.  In addition, sympathetic politicians, who declined to act or 
address these problems, hampered the control of the death squads . As a result, 
Vargas’s efforts encouraged a stronger paramilitary presence and showed that elected 
officials ignored the crimes committed against their country. 
 
3. Collusion between the Colombian Government and Death Squads 
FOIA documentation by U.S diplomats shows a strong connection between drug 
running paramilitary groups and elements of the Colombian military during the 1990s. 
Many historians have used these sources to highlight the enabling of human rights 
abuses that death squads committed with military aid from the United States.57  One 
 
55 Part of Vargas 1989 Anti Paramilitary decrees, called for the creation of a commission to oversee the government's 
anti-paramilitary efforts. The commission was to include the Ministers of Government, Justice, and National Defense, 
along with the chiefs of the Army, National Police, and DAS. The commission was supposed to plan ways to cut down 
on paramilitary violence and oversee the execution of these plans. However, most of the people in the commission 
had either openly voiced support for the paramilitaries or headed agencies with extraordinarily strong ties to 
paramilitary groups, and the commission rarely met over the following decade. 
56 “Uppsala Conflict Data Program,” UCDP, Accessed April 17th, 2020, 
https://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=35®ionSelect#. 
57Alfred Lindesmith, “COLOMBIA: Secret Documents Show US Aware of Army Killings,” IPS News, last modified 
August 12th 1993, http://www.ipsnews.net/. 
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such document was a cable tie to the U.S Ambassador Robert McNamara who wrote 
“human rights in Colombia – widespread allegations of abuses by the army.” It cites 
reports from a U.S army adviser58 indicating that “a Colombian major personally 
directed the torture of 11 detainees and their subsequent execution…carried out by 
cutting off the limbs and heads of the still living victims with a chain saw.”59 Additionally, 
further evidence from the cable tie also links “the Colombian paramilitaries to the police 
and military.” In one such case, there was a declassified 1992 report showing that the 
military executed 9 civilians dressed up as members of the guerrillas after their murders 
at the hands of paramilitary death squads. They were buried, but a Colombian military 
judge realized that the bullet holes did not match the clothes they were wearing.60 This 
event proved that the military was actively receiving bodies from paramilitary soldiers 
and they were making minimal efforts to hide their own crimes as they did not fear 
prosecution. In addition, it also shows a reliance on paramilitary groups by members of 
the Colombian military that persists even today. It is therefore deplorable to think that a 
criminal group, such as the paramilitaries, are actively used as frontline soldiers and 
treated as comrades by the very people charged with protecting the citizens of 
Colombia. Taking this relationship into account, one aspect from which paramilitary 
squads derive their immunity from government prosecution becomes clear, that of their 
close association with the military. 
Unsurprisingly, the declassified reports give credibility to the nickname locals 
have given the Colombian paramilitaries, the “sixth division, (the Colombian military has 
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five).” Many citizens perceive the paramilitary troops as a group sharing information, 
equipment, radios, and common purpose with regular military units to effectively earn 
them this name.61 Additionally, the Colombian Army has shown complicity and even 
become collaborators to crimes committed by paramilitary forces. For example, there 
was a massacre in Chengue, in the Municipality of Sucre, where twenty-four men lay 
dead after their skulls were crushed with a sledgehammer. Yet, there were no signs of 
military intervention to protect or help the victims. On the contrary, around two dozen 
residents testified that the military cordoned off the area and allowed paramilitaries to 
hunt down their targets. They further provided safe passage out of the kill site and made 
no attempt to apprehend the paramilitaries involved.62 This event confirmed that the 
military covered up the crimes of paramilitaries and, by doing so, helped them to avoid 
prosecution. 
Valles’ earlier testimonies depicting death at the hands of paramilitary death 
squads provide insight into the setbacks and problems that Colombian prosecutors had 
when trying to investigate paramilitaries. In 1998, Deputy Prosecutor of Antiquota and 
best friend of Valles, Ivan Velasquez Gomez, became determined to bring these 
criminals to justice after his friend’s death.63 Gomez’s investigation into the paramilitary 
squads was only accepted on the basis that he specifically picked those he worked with. 
His own predecessor as Deputy Prosecutor had been assassinated only a few years 
earlier. The CTI investigative unit for the prosecutor’s office, however, was under 
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constant attack from the paramilitary squads whose crimes they sought to expose.64 
There was also concern that, according to a senior agent, Diego Arcila, that the CTI unit 
was actively infiltrated by informants working for paramilitary squads, feeding them 
information and contributing to their silence. In another example, a witness to the 
kidnapping of two men gave a statement to the prosecutor’s office where he believed 
the CTI was involved in their disappearance. Shortly after, the witness was found with 
three gunshot wounds to the head.65 Gomez, on the other hand, did not have authority 
over the CTI, which meant that his investigation was partly at the mercy of a unit likely 
sympathetic to the very criminals he was investigating.66 
The first part of Gomez’s investigation into the paramilitaries pointed to a man 
named Gustavo Upegi. He had been an important member of Pablo Escobar’s inner 
circle managing the finances and expenses of his drug empire and the Medellin cartel.67 
Gomez also believed that Upegui controlled La Terraza, which was a legacy 
organization of the Medellin cartel that had allied with the AUC in 1998. Upegi’s name 
was uncovered after Gomez interviewed the family of a kidnapping victim who had 
sought help from the businessman. A second kidnapping then followed in retaliation.68 
Investigators believed Upegi was behind this crime and that he had coordinated with 
security forces in the area. The reason was that there were hints of wiretapping in the 
case such as knowing exactly where the victims were and the movements of the local 
police.69 Additionally, two members of the CTI unit, Jaime Piedrahita and Manuel López, 
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tried to come to the prosecutor’s office to expose the influence of Upegi on their office, 
and both were killed before they could testify. 
In late 1998, Gomez’s break came as a former paramilitary member under threat 
of death reached out to them for protection. The young prosecutor, with the help of the 
very few people he trusted in the CTI, wiretapped the paramilitary safehouse and 
realized that many of them were former military members.70 Paramilitary organizations 
offered competitive salaries compared to the paltry sum that soldiers might have earned 
fighting in the regular army. In addition, the military grunts viewed them as allies to their 
“counterinsurgency campaigns”71 against the guerrillas. Not surprisingly, these 
paramilitary organizations had a close relationship with the military, and they even drew 
most of their recruits from their forces.  Based on Gomez’s investigation, Colombian 
police were able to stop the robbery and mass execution of a bus group of 
businesspeople, as well as arrest multiple active duty soldiers who worked with the 
paramilitary organization ACCU. 
In 1999, Velasquez arrested Jacinto Alberto Soto, a key accountant for the 
ACCU. Soto’s log books contained weapons receipts, account numbers for ACCU bank 
accounts, and hard drives with other important organizational data.72 Soto also was an 
officer of the fourth brigade of the Colombian military. Soto’s experiences and 
documents became a key part of the prosecution’s efforts to cut off the financial backers 
of the paramilitary organization. However, direct investigations of the crimes and 
massacres committed by the ACCU were less successful as the military engaged in 
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obstruction of justice.73 For example, the Colombian Army prevented the investigators 
on Gomez’s team from entering the site of the El Aro massacre arguing either that there 
was combat going on in the area, or inclement weather conditions.74 
 The leader of Gomez’s investigation team Amelia Perez began looking closely 
into the conduct of the military units in the area. She found that, during the El Aro 
Massacre, paramilitaries were able to make off with around 1200 heads of cattle.75 
Furthermore, she found it unlikely that this could happen unless the military allowed it, 
which would again indicate unsettling collusion. Months later, the prosecutorial office 
finally entered the site of the El Aro Massacre and interviewed survivors, who were 
reluctant to come forward. They were scared because the paramilitaries had left a 
message behind in making everyone watch as they gang-raped and murdered Elvia 
Rosa Arezia. The terrified villagers saw how much the paramilitaries devalued the lives 
of their victims, and realized that seeking justice would only put their own lives and 
families in danger.76 The prosecutor’s office, however, found more witnesses in former 
paramilitaries seeking protection.  
Further testimony from ex-paramilitaries reported that they were forced every two 
weeks to dismember, or “split open alive” villagers to prove their courage.77  In addition, 
the soldiers gave testimony that the paramilitary squad they served in met with the 
Colombian military Gerardo Battalion, likely for coordination and information, just prior to 
the attack. According to this soldier, the military also provided ammunition and medicine 
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for the attackers through the landing of a military helicopter as the attack was taking 
place.78  In addition, he identified their “bloc” leader as Salvatore Mancuso. However, 
the documents that Velasquez’s office was combing over were transferred to the 
National prosecutor’s office in Bogota, as his office was facing personnel and logistical 
issues. Similarly, their key witness was also transferred. Someone entered Velasquez’s 
office and changed the destination for Soto from Bogota to a local prosecutor’s office, 
who released him.79 This prosecutor  was eventually convicted of receiving a payoff 
from the paramilitaries for releasing the witness. Furthermore, former paramilitaries lost 
faith in the efforts of witness protection out of Velasquez’s office as his close-knit group 
of CTI personnel was either fired or killed. To make matters worse, Amelia Perez’s 
attempts to issue arrest warrants for police officer Colonel Luis Rodríguez Pérez, who 
she proved had close ties to the paramilitary death squads, was withdrawn by her 
office.80 Perez was also reassigned shortly after she had issued this warrant. In 1999, 
Velasquez received a phone call from regional director Pablo Gonzalez asking him to 
resign from his chief prosecution position as they were restructuring the agency. He 
later learned that none of his other colleagues were asked to resign, and that he had 
been misled.81 With Velasquez out of the way, the case was essentially “lost” in the 
national prosecutor’s office, which was thereafter dominated by Luis Osorio. 
 Osorio argued that, despite extensive evidence to the contrary, they were 
neglecting cases against the guerrillas and instead were overly focused on the 
paramilitaries. Almost immediately, Osorio began purging the offices of prosecutors who 
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had been involved in major cases against paramilitaries.82 Therefore, those who 
continued to investigate paramilitary death squads were not only risking their lives but 
their careers. Perez was also no exception as she lost her job and, consequently, the 
protection offered to her by the office, including an armored car and bodyguards.83 As a 
result, Perez left Colombia for her own safety and the link she uncovered between the 
paramilitaries and the Colombian military became buried.84  Velasquez’s colleagues 
regretfully looked back on this case as they felt that, by trying to prosecute the ACCU, 
they painted targets on the backs of decent men and women. This event also showed 
the conflicts that prosecutors in Colombia encounter as they attempt to bring 
paramilitary squads to justice. Furthermore, the fact that these criminals were able to 
target investigators, “misplace evidence,” and pinpoint exactly who was working on their 
case is highly indicative of a collusion between the paramilitaries and the Colombian 
government. 
 
4.  Motivations of Colombian Death Squads and the reasoning behind Government 
impunity. 
 
In spite of all the crimes that paramilitaries committed against vulnerable groups of the 
population, many soldiers believed they were doing a public service. In other words, 
paramilitaries believed that by indiscriminately killing people of lower class such as the 
poor or prostitutes, that the general community will improve. Yet similarly, the soldiers 
 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
23 
themselves  came from humble and fragmented backgrounds that mirrored the victims 
of their amassed crimes. For example, a soldier from a small town in Colombia named 
Daniel mentioned that his main motivation for joining the paramilitaries was to keep 
himself from starving.85 Daniel’s town offered little hope for a legal lifestyle alternative, 
and he learned about the benefits of joining the paramilitary squads from a friend of his 
who served with them. Although young members were typically paid low wages, given 
irregular work, and considered largely expendable, the death squads offered an 
alternative for young men with little economic opportunities in rural Colombia. It was 
difficult for young squad members, however, to stay alive long enough to receive 
promotions and the cash benefits they desired. 
 Racial divisions also motivated the crimes of death squads. In the northern 
region of Colombia’s Choco Department, whose population is predominantly Afro 
Colombian, the death squads control 17 of the 23 communities.86  Paramilitaries believe 
they have a right to these lands, which belong to Afro-Colombians, for development by 
multinational corporations and growing coca to support the drug trade.87 Operation 
Genesis was one of the first of these plans put in motion to control Afro-Colombians’ 
lands.88 In 2013, the Inter-American court of Human Rights found the government of 
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Colombia guilty for not providing safe passage for those Afro-Colombians who were 
displaced. As a result, many Afro-Colombians lost their lives on the land their families 
have occupied for generations. The support of Colombian paramilitary squads would 
prove instrumental in accomplishing the extermination and forceful control of this Afro-
Colombian community.89 
 The death squad’s interest in Afro Colombian land has its roots in a 1993 
agreement giving them “the right to collectively own and occupy their own ancestral 
lands.”90 It included vast stretches of highly desirable mines, waterways and other 
natural resources. Aiming to control those resources, the state militarized the region 
through the use of paramilitary violence against guerrillas.91 The growing military 
intervention resulted in Afro Colombians being left out of the peace process between 
the government and guerilla groups. Since the peace deal has been signed, 566 
activists and community leaders have been murdered. The high number of victims show 
that the Colombian Government has not prioritized the safety of Afro-Colombians, 
despite their communities being in the middle of their fights against guerilla groups. The 
state has therefore allowed Colombian paramilitaries a free pass to commit crimes 
against these people not only for the sake of economic development but also for the 
gradual marginalization of their voices in society.  Thus, these actions have granted a 
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form of social control to the government over both the impoverished citizens who fill the 
ranks of the paramilitary squads, and their Afro Colombian victims. 
 
5.    Prosecutorial Immunity of the Death Squads 
From the late 1990’s to early 2000’s, events continued to show the close 
relationship between the paramilitaries and the Colombian military, and unveiled a more 
visible connection with Colombian politicians.  During the elections,  paramilitaries were 
often used as enforcers to “control the vote” of impoverished citizens.92 In 2002, for 
example, a paramilitary leader by the name of Cadena sent trucks to round citizens up 
and take them to see the candidate they were required to vote for.93 In other cases, “ 
terror was used to keep citizens from the polls” or paramilitary thugs simply employed 
the theft of their cedulas, or voter cards, from their homes.  Paramilitary leader 
Salvatore Mancuso mentioned how they collected taxes, “delivered justice,” and 
controlled who entered politics through their own representatives. Moreover, he 
estimated that around 35% of the Colombian Congress was elected from areas 
governed by these self-defense groups.94 These actions showed that paramilitary 
soldiers directly controlled the democratic process for Colombian citizens and that, in 
many cases, they acted with the voice and authority of the formal government. 
Additionally, the fact that they were never driven out by the Colombian military again 
shows a lack of accountability and opposition from the authorities. As a result, the 
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paramilitary soldiers derived some of their judicial immunity from ensuring that pro-
paramilitary politicians entered the government. 
By 2002, efforts to bring  paramilitary groups to justice culminated when 
Colombia ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.95 As a result, the 
court would not have jurisdiction over past crimes, but, in theory, paramilitary atrocities 
committed after ratification could one day come under the court’s purview. In addition, 
then U.S attorney general John Ashcroft indicted AUC leader Carlos Castano, his 
lieutenant Salvatore Mancuso, and AUC affiliated drug trafficker Juan Carlos Sierra.96 
The leaders of the AUC facing decades in American federal prisons and extradition 
rushed to get ahead of this development. Castano found his answer in negotiations with 
the Uribe administration. In 2003, they declared a “ceasing of hostilities,” and their 
intention for demobilization by 2005.97 Furthermore, in late August of 2003, Uribe 
introduced a bill that would protect the paramilitaries from prosecution for all their 
crimes—including the worst massacres and atrocities, as well as drug trafficking, if they 
agreed to put down their weapons.98 Consequently, the paramilitaries would not have to 
serve any time in prison or even confess their crimes, nor would they have to give up 
their illegally acquired wealth or disclose any details about their accomplices and drug-
trafficking networks.99  
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 The administration of Alvaro Uribe between 2002 and 2010 did nothing to 
alleviate the injustices and crimes of the death squads. In fact, Uribe’s government 
would go on to further encourage the crimes of death squads. Uribe had made a name 
for himself during the 1980s and 1990s as someone who backed the establishment of 
paramilitary groups, and expressly voiced his support for CONVIVIR.100 According to 
the evidence cited at trial against him in 2018, Uribe’s family estate served as a ground 
for training, and outfitting up and coming paramilitaries who served with AUC soldiers  
since 1999.101 In addition, he is also presently standing trial for massacres that occurred 
in areas that he governed over. Among others, these massacres occurred in small 
villages near Antioquia such as El Aro, La Granja and San Roque, where paramilitary 
squads murdered, raped, and displaced from their homes hundreds of people.102 
Furthermore, Colombian prosecutors believe Uribe had a hand in planning these crimes 
against humanity.  
During his administration, Uribe kept many supporters of death squads within his 
intelligence gathering units, presidential cabinets, and military advisers. Jorgue 
Noguera, the chief of Colombian Intelligence unit DAS,103 was accused and convicted of 
passing information to right-wing paramilitary groups for the purposes of targeting 
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dissident individuals and guerrillas in 2005.104 Other prosecuted individuals were also 
part of Uribe’s administration including former DAS chief María del Pilar Hurtado, and 
his chief of staff Bernardo Moreno. Lastly, perhaps one of the most significant ties of 
Uribe to paramilitary groups, is the testimony from a former AUC member simply known 
as “Victor” who mentioned that the AUC financially supported his 2002 presidential 
campaign.105 This financial support likely was a gift from a group that had been allies 
with him over the course of several decades. Uribe’s administration had supplied these 
paramilitary groups with information, weapons, and a training ground to strengthen their 
grip over the Colombian people. As a result, government interference protected these 
criminals from prosecution and encouraged them to continue to prey on those left 
defenseless. 
Between 2002 and 2008, the Colombian military also participated in the routine 
execution of civilians.106 During these operations, soldiers were offered cash rewards 
and promotions for their inflated body counts. As a result, civilians were turned over to 
the soldiers' superior officers dressed as guerrillas and carrying weapons. Reports 
indicate that this had been going on at least since 1992, but according to the 
organization human rights watch, this matter was not investigated until the victims were 
from more affluent neighborhoods.107 The Bogota suburb of Soacha, for example, was a 
 
104“The Biggest Fish so Far,” The Economist Newspaper, last modified September 15, 2011, 
https://www.economist.com/americas-view/2011/09/15/the-biggest-fish-so-far. 
105Adriaan, Alselma. “The Witnesses Who Will Begin Testifying in Uribe Trial on September 3.” Colombia 
Reports, last modified August 19, 2019, https://colombiareports.com/the-witnesses-who-will-begin-testifying-in-
uribe-trial-on-september-3/. 
106 “On Their Watch: Evidence of Senior Army Officers' Responsibility for False Positive Killings in Colombia.” 
Human Rights Watch, last modified July 9, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/24/their-watch/evidence-
senior-army-officers-responsibility-false-positive-killings. 
107 “On Their Watch: Evidence of Senior Army Officers' Responsibility for False Positive Killings in Colombia,” 
Human Rights Watch, last modified July 9, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/24/their-watch/evidence-
senior-army-officers-responsibility-false-positive-killings. 
29 
strong contributor to the estimated 3,000 “false positive” victims killed at the hands of 
Colombian military personnel.108 This would suggest that prosecution in Colombia and 
the protection of its citizens are limited exclusively to those with money. Moreover, the 
military’s actions deemed citizens expendable and worth nothing more than numbers on 
a sheet. Therefore, members of the Colombian military thought alike with those of the 
paramilitary death squads. The sanctioning of these programs by top generals also 
shows a way that the Colombian military has protected death squads from prosecution. 
In other words, if these actions were acceptable inside the military, it would bring into 
doubt their criminality when committed by paramilitary squads acting on their behalf.  It 
is also important to note that almost all of the military generals who promoted these 
programs and failed to adequately confirm the bodies of the “guerrillas”  avoided 
prosecution or any real consequences.109 In relation to their atrocities, 800 soldiers have 
been convicted to date, yet their ranks have not surpassed that of junior officers. In 
contrast, Generals who were in command of the offending fifth and seventh divisions 
were all either forcibly retired or left willingly.110 It is then evident that prosecutorial 
immunity for death squads were closely related to the Uribe administration. In addition, 
the financial support that Uribe received from paramilitary squads calls into question the 
objectivity of his administration which clearly acted in leniency toward these criminals. 
In 2012, after Uribe's administration, the Colombian government finally acted 
against corrupt political officials, guerrillas, and paramilitary squads. The International 
criminal court issued a report establishing evidence of significant human right’s 
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violations and making a strong case for the prosecution of many top officials within the 
AUC paramilitary group.111 Many of these individuals, however, served only a few years 
before being granted freedom or parole. In one such case Luis Eduardo Cifuentes, a top 
paramilitary commander, who confessed to 15 murders and a forced disappearance, 
but ultimately served only six years before being granted parole in 2018.112 Salvatore 
Mancuso, second in command of the AUC, by contrast, was also extradited in 2008, 
along with other 40 paramilitaries, to the United States, where they remain today.113 
American courts, however, treated them as first time offenders, even though Mancuso 
himself had already been prosecuted nine times in Colombian, and they received short 
sentences to American prisons.114 These extraditions for drug charges robbed justice 
from countless Colombian families who lost family members to the atrocities committed 
by the AUC. In addition, this has allowed the time prosecutors have to bring charges 
against these commanders within Colombia to “run out.”  In 2015, seven years after the 
extradition order, Colombian prosecutors were forced to drop drug charges against 
Salvatore Mancuso and AUC members of the Catatumbo Bloc.115 As a result of these 
extraditions, prosecutors did not have the opportunity to question the suspects and run 
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a thorough investigation to make their case in Colombia. Therefore, without this 
evidence, the extraditions have weakened the local prosecutors' criminal cases in 
Colombia, and prevented justice.116 Moreover, in 2013, the Colombian supreme court 
absolved Mancuso of a 1996 Massacre, in spite of  his confession to investigators.117 
The U.S extradition of AUC members has severely hampered the efforts of Colombian 
officials in bringing a case against the crimes of the paramilitary. Furthermore, it is also 
unknown what human rights cases will still be pursued by Colombia officials upon their 
return, and if any of them will succeed. Again, these are obstacles to prosecution, but 
they were put there at the behest of the Colombian government, and specifically during 
the government of Alvaro Uribe. This president agreed to the extradition because he 
believed the men were still dealing drugs from inside the prison.118 Yet, the lenient 
conditions that paramilitaries face in American prisons and the immunity from the 
prosecution they enjoy demonstrate a collaboration between the Uribe administration 
and his criminal allies, who have served him well. 
       
5.     Conclusion 
In conclusion, the story of Colombian paramilitarism began as a development of 
the cold war. U.S advisory teams sent in the 1950s under Eisenhower made 
recommendations to the Colombian military, as well as the president to enact 
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counterinsurgency measures to ensure stability. Thus, civil defense patrols emerged to 
support the Colombian military in bringing down communist enclaves in the jungle. This 
close working relationship between both paramilitary groups and the military themselves 
has created a collaboration that persists today. As a result, crimes against humanity 
such as in the case of Omaira Fernandez are not uncommon for the paramilitary who 
believe that they are an untouchable force. In addition, extortion rackets, drug trafficking 
rings, and killings of those who speak out against them have fully secured their power in 
the region. Clearly, it is then the close association between paramilitaries and the 
Colombian government that has contributed to their lack of prosecution and 
accountability for their crimes. 
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